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Elizabeth Wilson & Andreas Ströhl
On the Philosopher Vilém Flusser
"It's the End of the World as We Know It--and I Feel Fine"
(REM)
On 27 November 1991, one of the most interesting contemporary
theorists of postmodernity died in the former Czechoslovakia.
Vilém Flusser is virtually unknown in the United States, but in
recent years he had become increasingly influential in Europe.
Since his death, an even broader segment of the intellectual
community has become interested in his work.
Like many cultural critics writing on the present, Flusser
believed that the most distinctive feature of postmodern societies
is the increasing dominance of electronic means of communication.
The new media simultaneously offer great opportunities and present
grave dangers; but theorists of the postmodern have all too often
refused to see their ambivalent potential, choosing either to view
them optimistically, as a vehicle for immediate human liberation,
or pessimistically, as the intangible shackles of an unprecedented
form of human oppression. Flusser's ability to grasp the
ambivalent potential of the postmodern sets him apart from other
contemporary theorists.
Writing on many subjects, including art, technology, science,
religion, and philosophy, Flusser tried to conceptualize, in broad
theoretical terms, the basic epochs in the development of human
experience. It was Flusser's view that "History" in the
philosophical sense--as the idea of temporal and social progress--
has a specific birth and is destined to have a specific death.
History is a product of writing: the setting of letters (and
events) in a linear order. Before the invention of writing,
history was unthinkable. The new was not deduced from the old.
Thinking was not causal. The rooster crowed and the sun rose. The
transition from magical to historical ways of thinking occurred so
long ago that historical thinking has come to seem natural, even
though residues of magical thinking continue to exist in the midst
of more historical forms.
Flusser believed that we have entered a transitional period
between historical and post-historical thinking. Linear thinking--
based on writing and essential to history--is about to be put
aside by a new form of thinking that is much more complex, multi-
dimensional and visual, based on algorithms, and inspired by
systems theory and chaos theory. As the image was suited to the
prehistorical period and writing to the historical period, so the
numerical code (and its visualization) is suited to the coming
posthistorical period. Digitally-computed information reflects the
character of the coming time, just as writing, from the Bible to
Ulysses, reflected the character of the epochs of historical
thinking and feeling.
In his work, Flusser set himself the enormous task of trying to
imagine the forms of life that postmodernism is likely to bring
into being. In order to speculate about the outcome of the present
change of paradigms, he evolved a new genre mixing narrative,
essay, and fantasy: philosophical "scenarios." With the biologist
Louis Bec, he invented a fictitious creature: the Vampyroteuthis
infemalis. Despite his curiosity about new life forms, Flusser
never supposed that historical thinking would be entirely
supplanted. Rather, it would undergo mutations and coexist
alongside the new, just as magical (pre-historic) thinking has in
the historical epoch. He argued against the common misconception
that historical thinking and writing will suddenly and completely
be replaced by posthistorical and visual thinking. Instead, both
tendencies will co-exist for a long time. It will take generations
for this new way of perceiving and thinking to conquer the daily
lives and the consciousness of the majority of people.
Intellectuals and the new technical elites, however, are well
aware of the changes that are taking place at present, and there
are already attempts to draw consequences from these changes of
paradigms and to philosophize and live differently and also to
produce different forms of art.
Flusser disdained the narrow confines of traditional disciplines
as artificial distinctions created by linear thinking and tried as
much as possible not to reinscribe a subject-object distinction in
his work. According to Flusser, for example, no meaningful
distinction can be drawn between reality and representation, for
they differ only in degree of probability, not in essence. In this
respect, Flusser goes beyond Jean Baudrillard, the French
philosopher of communication, who maintains that "today...the real
and the imaginary are confused" (Simulations [Semiotext(e), 1983]
150).
This is true, not only of things, but of human beings. We are not
"more" real than simulations. We are not subjects but projects.
Flusser was intensely interested in the potential of virtual
reality to enable human beings to create and manipulate their
environments. He believed that programming--taken in the broadest
possible sense--would enable human beings to realize their
creativity in both beautiful and terrible forms. At the same time,
he knew that embracing the technological potential now available
to humans would bring about a rupture with the humanist traditions
of the past and the forms of subjectivity associated with them.
Though aware that traditional humanism was unable to prevent forms
of oppression, Flusser nevertheless saw a "new humanism" that
might be deployed against inhumane aspects of the postmodern.
Flusser was one of the few remaining survivors of the Czech
Jewish-German intellectual tradition that was centered in Prague
and included among its members the writers Franz Kaflka and Franz
Werfel and the philosopher Edmund Husserl who used the
"phenomenological method" of "bracketing" off mental
presuppositions in order to see phenomena in their essences.
Flusser was also influenced by the language philosophy of Ludwig
Wittgenstein and by many aspects of Walter Benjamin's writings on
art, technology, and history.
In contrast to the analytically penetrating tradition of
modernity, represented by theorists like Marx or Freud, Flusser
directed his main interest to surfaces (and interfaces). He
emphasized the creative possibilities of communication, of
artificially created, humane, "soft," and superficial worlds. His
greatest following came from young intellectual artists and
artistically-oriented intellectuals in Europe.
During the course of his life, he published numerous essays on a
wide range of topics and many books, among them the following: Fur
Eine Philosophie der Fotografie (1983) explores the implications
for human society of the transition from writing culture to image
culture. (An English translation of this work appeared in 1984
under the title Towards a Philosophy of Photography; it is the
only one of Flusser's books available in English to date.) Die
Schrift ("Writing" [1987]) asks what is lost if the alphanumeric
code of writing is superseded. (This work is also available in a
diskette version for MS-DOS.) Angenommen ("Supposed" [1989]) is a
"series of scenes" imagining the shape of future models of social
organization in order to reflect, like science fiction, on the
current change of paradigms. Nachgeschichten ("Post-Histories"
[1990]) considers the different implications of "the end of
history" in the post-industrial world. In 1992, Flusser's
"philosophical autobiography" was published under the title
Bodenlos ("Bottomless").
Vilém Flusser was born in 1920. He began studying philosophy at
Charles University in Prague in 1939. After fleeing from the Nazi
occupation to England and from there to Brazil, he continued his
studies. In 1959 he became a docent of the philosophy of science.
In 1963 he was appointed a Professor of the philosophy of
communication. Beginning in 1966 he went on lecture tours and was
a visiting professor at various universities. In 1972 he returned
to Europe and eventually settled in Robion, France. He died in a
car crash near the Czech-German border after delivering his first
public lecture in Prague, the city of his birth.
We present and introduce here a small selections of texts by Vilém
Flusser, one originally written in English, the others translated
by us from German for this publication.
"The Glory that Touches the Stars" ("Der Ruhm, der die Sterne
beruhrt") was written in 1975, during the worst period of
"Normalization" in Czechoslovakia, when the ruling Communist Party
tried to undo the achievements of the Prague Spring of 1968. The
essay was, however, not published until 1990. The opening of the
text refers to the founding myth of the city of Prague (and the
Czech nation). On Vysehrad, a hill in Prague, Krok's daughter
Libuse had a vision of a great city...
The Glory that Touches the Stars
There, where the Vltava, in a mighty loop, flows through the
cauldron of the wooded hills, there will rise--according to an old
legend--a great city whose glory will touch the stars. Just as the
seer once lifted her spirit a little above the temporal in order
to see into the future by looking backwards and to announce the
city that is striving for the stars, so have I been a little
removed from reality since I have been expelled from that
cauldron.
Maybe this is why I and the few like me have the gift of seeing
coming things when we look back, things that mysteriously
condense, like cooling steam above the boiling stew of that
cauldron. Aren't we all, you dear siblings, Wenzel and Hus, Karl
and Rudolf, Kaflka and Rabbi Loew, Dvorak and Rilke, a product of
that stew and at the same time happily hovering above it? The
pious duke and the rebel, the wise and the raging emperor, the
destroyer of the natural and the creator of the artificial human
being, the pseudo-believing singer of the Stabat Mater and the
pseudo-unbelieving singer of the elegies, these are the pillars of
the star-touching glory, around which the martyr Nepomuk, perhaps
unnoticed, twines.
So this is the glory I want to proclaim, the glory of the spirit
that rises up in pain against the heavens. If ever a city, like
Prometheus, stabbed a hundred spires into the heavens and clenched
hundreds of cupolas, absurdly, desperately decided to conquer the
world for the spirit, it was the dear little mother Prague, the
heart of Europe, as it has been called. And if ever, in old
Europe, this proud, licking flame should jerk up from the glowing
ashes, then it will be there out of the lap of the lost beloved.
Homesickness, admiration, and curses to the sunken home country.
It is often said that the Western spirit is a compound of the
classic Greek-Jewish tradition and the Germanic in a Latin
solution. Out of this gathering of roots, it has been said,
sprouts the tree of the Occident that bears the blossoms of
Christianity, of science, of music, and of philosophy. If this is
true, however, Prague is indeed more Western than the West. The
subterranean threads that connect her with the Greek orthodoxy,
and thus with the academy and the lyceum, have never been torn.
Not only the church but the winding penetrating spirit of its
ghetto directly make Prague Jewish. He who dares put into question
the Germanic quality of this German emperor city misconstrues
Prague's character. As far as latinity is concerned, it is the
capital of the Holy Roman Empire. Added to this pure culture of
Western ingredients, however, is the Slav yeast. How all of these
ingredients mix and separate, how they fight and influence each
other, and how they ferment and overflow, in order to inseminate
and to bum Europe, this is a history of the struggle between
spirit and commandment, between heaven and hell. It is the Prague
history.
It is therefore my history and the history of those, who, like me,
have been flung out of the center of the opposing powers into the
light of day. This brew, left alone, flows along muddily and
ashily, through the narrow alleys of the Old Town, in order to
trickle, petty bourgeois-like, beneath the trellises of the Little
Ardor. As long as you don't stir it up, nothing else is as dirty
grey and as shallow, as mendacious and deceptively tender, as this
Prague kasch. Whirled in the centrifuge of purification, it begins
to glitter green and violet, sometimes golden. An example of this
is the highly polished but broken crystal of Kaflka. In it, the
light of Europe is refracted into its Prague spectrum. That is to
say, faith and the creative impulse appear with a rationalist aura
and thus acquire a devilish glimmer. Or, put differently, the
mystically mysterious becomes clear and banal and the quotidian
and the taken-for-granted become opaque. It is the curse of this
city that it banalizes what is real and authentic and makes real
what is banal. That it reveals the lie but does not accept the
truth. That it does not kill its children, like Athens did
Socrates, but that it maims and abandons them.
Today a lid has laid itself upon this cauldron. Probably it is
under high pressure. We know nothing of the secret processes that
develop under the protection and pressure of this envelope. What
we occasionally see is only the dirty grey, the flat brew. As long
as Prague will still be Prague, however, there will come a moment
of purification, and the dark red sparks will spray again, not in
order to bum themselves but to ignite. Prague, the ignition of the
European motor, will again make white humankind jolt into idling
against the heavens and for the spirit. I see a great city whose
glory touches the stars.
(©1990 Stefan Bollman Verlag, Dusseldorf)
"Introduction" ("Einleitung") opens up the questions which the
book Die Schrift ("Writing") explores in detail: does writing have
a future? What will it be like? How are the new codes going to
change the meaning of writing? What is specific about writing? How
does it shape our minds?
Flusser writes: "The reflections in this text propose that there
are really only two escape routes from writing: back to the image
or forward to the codes. Back to the imagination or forward into
calculation. These reflections put forward that these two
directions can merge surprisingly into one another: figures can be
computed to images. From textual writing/thinking we can try to
escape into imagined calculations. If we succeeded, the
calculating and imaginative thinking would be sublated into
textual thinking. Writers then would have swallowed and digested
mathematicians and image-makers and thus lifted themselves onto a
new level of thinking" ("Afterword," Die Schrift).
Flusser's attitude to writing is ambiguous. While skeptical about
the future of writing, he identifies with those whose very
existence depends on writing: "scribere necesse est, vivere non
est. "
We present here the "Introduction" and chapter sixteen, "Desks,"
from Die Schrift.
Introduction
Writing, in the sense of the lining-up of letters and other
writing signs, seems to have no future or almost none. In the
meantime, there are codes that transmit information better than
writing signs. What has been written until now can be better
transferred on tapes, records, films, videotapes, picture discs,
or diskettes. And much of what could not be written until now can
be recorded in these new codes. The information that is coded thus
is more convenient to produce, to transport, to receive, and to
store than written texts. In the future, with the help of the new
codes, we will be better able to correspond, make science, talk
about politics, write poetry, and philosophize than we are in the
alphabet or in Arab figures. It seems as if the codes of writing,
like the Egyptian hieroglyphs, or the Indian knots, would be put
aside. In the future, only historians and other specialists will
have to learn how to write and read.
Many people don't want to see the truth of this. Mainly because of
inertia. They have already learned how to write once, and they are
too old to learn the new codes. We surround this inertia of ours
with the aura of splendor and nobility. With writing, so we say,
we lose all that we owe to a Homer, an Aristotle, a Goethe. Not to
speak about the Holy Scripture. Only, how do we happen to know
that these great authors (including the author of the Holy
Scripture) would not have preferred to speak on tape or to make a
film?
Inertia alone, however, does not explain everything. There are
people (and I count myself among them) who believe they cannot
live without writing. And this is not because they want to emulate
Homer--for they know: it is no longer possible to write like him,
even if they were a second
Homer--but they believe they have to write because their existence
expresses itself in the gesture of writing and only in that
gesture.
In that, however, they can be wrong. But even if it is assumed
that they are right and that the production of video clips is not
adequate to their existence, their "forma mentis," wouldn't this
be the proof that their shape of existence is passe, that such
people are dinosaurs? I admit, not everything that is passe is
necessarily pernicious. What is called "progress" is not
necessarily synonymous with improvement. The dinosaurs were
finally quite nice animals in their own way. And yet the will to
persist in writing becomes questionable these days.
It is to be asked: what is specific about writing? In what does it
differ from comparable past and future gestures--from painting,
from pushing computer keys? Is there anything specific at all that
is common to all kinds of writing gestures--the carving of Latin
letters into marble, the painting of Chinese ideograms on silk,
the scribbling of equations on blackboards, the pressing of
typewriter keys? What kind of existence did human beings have
before they began to write? And what would their existence look
like if writing were given up? All these and numerous other
questions should of course not only be directed to writing itself
but also to the reading of written texts.
These are simple questions only at first glance. It would be
necessary to write a voluminous book in order to get a hold of
them. The catch, however, is that such a book would be a book.
Instead of what? That is exactly what stands in question.
16 Desks
Before desks are compared with the future apparatuses that will
replace them, it is useful to make tabula rasa. An empty table is
more than just a mostly wooden bar supported by four legs or a
kind of simplified artificial beast of burden. In addition it is
an ideal that can never be reached: again and again, you plan to
release it from its burden and to finally clear your desk. And
filled with envy, you watch the huge and empty desks on TV behind
which the supposedly mighty are sitting. If you imagine yourself
in their places, then you gain a new perspective on the mightiness
and the desk. The word "Macht" [might] is a noun of the verb
"mogen" [to like]. Its equivalent in the Romanic languages is the
noun of the verb "konnen" [to be able to]. What might the mighty
possibly like, what may they be able to do when the table they are
sitting at is empty? Don't their possibilities and potentialities
vanish into nothing? And don't they realize themselves precisely
in that organized chaos on the desk that has to be accomplished? A
phenomenology of power after centuries of anti-phenomenological
discussion would have to assume that the point is a foray into
possibilities that realize themselves in resistances, that
therefore power is not anything already real that you have to obey
or against which you could fight, but that power looks for
resistance in order to realize itself at all. Refusing to resist
(for instance in the case of the empty table) obliterates the
power, and you don't have to be Gandhi in order to realize this.
It is enough to imagine an empty desk. It is the will to power
that seduces us to go into the stationery store in order to
collect all this writing material there, to replenish it again and
again and to fill our desk. The purpose, however, is not a will to
power-in-general but to a wholly specific power, that is, to the
so-called power of the pen. Even though there whole classes of
power, this kind of power usually is put in contrast to that of
the sword. The power the pen radiates, the possibilities and
potentialities (the field of the pen) that it exudes have a
specific structure; nevertheless, a systematic theory of the field
of the pen has yet to be developed. If iron shavings are caught in
a magnet's field of power, then we see how this power realizes
itself. Even though we have plunged at least as deeply into the
field of the pen as into the electromagnetic field, we
nevertheless lack appropriate Einsteins. Probably because--in
contrast to the "natural fields"--the ideological fields have
always been ideologically unified before they have been looked
into in detail. The marxist attempt of dialectically tracing back
all the fields of power, including that of the pen, to one basic
field (that of the economic base) offers an example. It is well-
known that Einstein could not manage to reduce all fields like
this because the well-known details of the different fields
resisted it.
What seduces the writing person to go into the stationery store in
order to grab the power of the pen has been partly discussed in
this essay, even though a theory of the field of the pen has not
been proposed.
The will to straighten circles into lines and to reach others,
thanks to these lines, seduces the writing person to go to the
stationery store in order to grab the power of the pen. That the
will to this specific power has realized itself in the shape of
Western culture and that, in this sense, the field of power of the
pen can be called the "Unterbau" (base) of our society, is what
this essay implies--which does not exclude that which from other
perspectives, from other fields of power can be regarded as
"Unterbau" as well. The will to this specific power has the desk
as its starting point.
On the average desk, chaos rules: papers, maps, staples, ash-
trays, typewriters, telephones and other things are lying on it
and are lit by a desk lamp. There is no average desk and we are
only now coming to agree on what chaos is. The average desk is an
abstraction from all desks theoretically and every phenomenology
of the desk must--being conscious of the arrogance of equating
this desk here and now with the average--start with the concrete
desk here and now.
As "chaos," we (provisionally) understand a situation whose
structure has not yet been discerned or a situation that comes up
after a structure has been discerned. Put differently: "chaos" is
where order has not yet been stated or grasped completely.
The chaos on my desk equals that in the universe of the natural
sciences. Whosoever approaches it unknowingly sees a disorderly
mess. Then he begins to state correlations, a method in its
madness. When I am sitting at the desk and writing, I am located
in an admirable cosmos: everything is in its place and at my
service. In this I am the Aristotle as well as the Newton of my
desk: all the writing material is in its proper place and must,
should it ever leave it, return there. All the writing material
can be exactly located in present, past and future if you know the
layout of the desk. If, however, I step back from myself and my
desk and look over the difficult relationship between it and me,
then I become more and more Heisenbergian: what I regarded as
order on my desk turns out to be a raw simplification that I
myself project upon the desk. That proves itself, if I happen to
look for a needle on it. To that extent, chaos rules on my desk.
Now I reach after power, that is, into chaos, in order to load two
white sheets of paper and a carbon paper into the typewriter. My
glance is directed neither to the papers nor to the typewriter. It
looks above them, beyond them, towards the text that is to be
written. The whole desk is only a contemptible means. Temporarily,
it is justified by a nebulous end. No coming-into-power whatsoever
can escape this justification of means. You can, however, try not
to despise the means but to look at them. This, however, produces
a strange bewilderment: the more attention I pay to the paper and
the typewriter, the more unclear the intended piece of writing
becomes. The glance at the desk displaces the text from the field
of vision. Therefore the demand placed on the powerful to think
about the means before applying them is already a refusal: the
powerful are demanded to become impotent. Indeed, the glance
directed at the table shows the impotence and not the power of
writing. The ancient saying "respice finem" probably means you
should always remember death, but it can also be interpreted as
advice to look across the table: not to let the means paralyze
you.
If I sit at the desk in order to look at it (instead of to write),
then it blows cold at me. Mainly because of two reasons: first,
there are two anti-writing tools on it, telephone and radio--two
extraterrestrial invaders in the universe of writing; and second,
the power of the pen--which wants to be a form of power of the
unbound "spirit"--turns out to be bound to the trickiness of the
writing tools.
If you regard the two ETs on the desk then you get the impression
that they represent two opposite intrusions of informatization
into writing. The radio must supply the background music and
serves the writing. When the telephone shrills in its idiotically
insistent way, it interrupts writing. So it would be possible to
conclude that the intruding informatization on the one hand
idiotically disturbs writing but that the power of the pen can
manage to make it submit. This is a faulty conclusion. The
background music that the radio supplies is not that white noise
which contrasts with the information created during writing (as
the theory of communication has it); rather, it is a mockery of
writing. It whispers into the ear of the writing person: the
information that you create is, in the end, not directed to
readers but to my black box in order to become background music
there itself. And the insistently shrilling telephone does not
interrupt the writing but terminates it in order to say: in me a
new power takes the floor against which the pen fights in vain.
The empty desks of the powerful shown on TV bear, visually or not,
armies of telephones. In the case of the highly powerful there is
a red telephone among them. The powerful sit at the desk in order
to operate telephones--and not in order to write. This function is
regarded as power. A Wittgensteinian question comes up: what is
the sense of the sentence, "this is a desk but it does not serve
the writing"? The two ETs on the desk are paralyzing because they
annihilate the power of the pen and at the same time the term
"power."
If you direct your attention to the remaining material on the
desk, then the definition of writing as the manipulation of
symbols becomes questionable. Do I indeed struggle against soft
material (software), like the letters and the language they
signify, while I am writing, or don't I have to cope most of all
with the obnoxious stubbornness of torn type-writer ribbons,
jammed staplers and hopelessly misplaced papers? He who never ate
his bread in tears (for instance, in the tears of rage because of
a typewriter that does not obey anymore) does not know you, you
heavenly powers of the pen. The criticism of literature only sees
the heavenly, not the earthly, in writing, with the exception of
extreme cases, as in the case of texts that were written in
gulags.
Isn't writing labor and, indeed, less a "spiritual" labor (a
questionable use of the term) than a physical one? Doesn't the
writer have to put into motion elegant fingertips but also vulgar
hands, teeth and licking tongues?
Suddenly, the informational revolution appears as relief. For if
you regard the desks as the ones shown in the advertisements of
the so-called "bureautik"--these white, pure laboratory tables--
with their paperless apparatuses at which smiling, elegant girls
are sitting--and if you compare them with your own desk
experience, then you realize yourself as a dinosaur that mucks
around in triassic mud. It is not yourself but the smiling girls
in the advertising posters who are engaged in the "spirit." The
writer who is sitting at the desk is that material resistance
against which they blow. It is only these girls who actually
manipulate software and who are more spiritual than we.
However, as soon as we direct our glance away from the means and
towards the text, as soon as we disdain the material that is
correctly called "stupid," we are grasped again by that excitement
that is meant by the term "will to power of the pen." Now a bitter
taste has seeped into the excitement. The material that we hold in
contempt now is stupid indeed, but in the advertisement posters we
have seen intelligent desks. Maybe we are excited about writing
because our desks are so stupid? And to the extent to which they
become more clever, are we writing people becoming more stupid?
This existential question, which comes up in the stationery stores
and which becomes dense on the desk, from now on accompanies all
our writing. It can be noticed in our texts and it can never again
be silenced. The desk that is standing on the brink--on the
"Northwest passage," as Serres says cannot be maintained once its
questionable position becomes visible. Its four legs wobble in
this earthquake. The poor donkey cannot be saved.
The glance that brings together stationery stores and desks makes
it possible to perceive the decline of writing as the decline of
politics. Stationery stores show--like all expositions and shops--
that the town and along with it the public space (the space of
publication) is condemned to vanish. And, in particular,
stationery stores show how, with the disappearance of paper, every
action is over as well. Desks show how the power of the pen stabs
into emptiness and cannot realize itself anymore as the term
"power" in general is pushed aside by the new term of
automatically guided function. So, all political thinking (which
is a thinking in categories of power) misses the post-writing
situation. Through the glance that brings together stationery
stores and desks, every political engagement of the writer is
recognized as a ridiculous error. This is why it is not advisable
to the majority of the writing people of today to risk this
glance. A glance that in addition reveals the well-known
disproportion between means and end from a new perspective. During
the entire culture of writing, the means were small and
contemptible, the aims were grand and noble. Isn't it ridiculous
to think of Dante's quill-pen while evaluating the end achieved in
"The Divine Comedy"? Without a doubt, in this case, the means have
been justified by the end. This has now become different. If you
regard the extraordinarily complex means which gather on an
intelligent desk and if you compare them with the end they pretend
to serve, then on the contrary you have to speak of a
justification of the end by the means. Just a visit to the
stationery store shows that the offered material is grander than
the notes to be composed--grander even than the writing it
pretends to serve. How much more intelligence is in such material
than in the scribbling~ that has been produced thanks to it! The
means have become so clever that every end is superfluous to them.
They become an end in themselves. All means becoming ends in
themselves and the superfluity of all ends is what "media culture"
means. This is especially visible when it comes to thermonuclear
armaments: the means are so powerful that wanting to ask about
their ends is simply stupid.
Finally the glance has been directed towards the means of writing
and, quite in accordance with the "spirit of the age," it
neglected the purpose of writing. Does the question "to what end?"
still have a sense when the straightened lines make room for the
puzzles composed of dots?
(© 1987
European Photography, Andreas Muller-Pohle, Goettingen)
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